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Responses spanned the sciences, with many questioning aspects of science itself. For example, writer Brian Christian took on current practices in scientific publishing, with others challenging a host of scientific ideals and assumptions: that scientific discovery should be valued over the lives of scientists (Kathryn Clancy), that scientists should stick to science (Buddhini Samarasinghe) and (inversely) that non-scientists can't do science (Kate Mills), that the hallmark of scientific claims is their falsifiability (Sean Carroll) and that there is "a" (singular) scientific method (Melanie Swan).
My own response questioned the reductionist idea that the mind is just the brain, arguing that explanations for behavior and mental states shouldn't be couched in strictly neuroscientific terms. In a related response, Joel Gold and Ian Gold urged that we do away with the idea that mental illness is nothing but brain illness. Instead, we should recognize that "understanding and treating brain disorders sometimes has to move outside the skull."
Our responses were just two of many to focus on psychology and the cognitive sciences. Quite a few essays, for example, took on formulations of nature versus nurture when it comes to human capacities and behaviors, an idea that — according to Timo Hanney — "truly deserves a bullet in the back of its head."
Steven Pinker questioned every term in the "genes + environment = behavior" equation. Alison Gopnik argued that when you take a close look, questions about what's innate can quickly become incoherent:
Of course, for a long time, people have pointed out that nature and nurture must interact for a particular trait to develop. But several recent scientific developments challenge the idea of innate traits in a deeper way. It isn't just that it's a little of both, some mix of nurture and nature, but that the distinction itself is fundamentally misconceived.
But other responses were directed more strongly towards one particular pole of the nature-nurture dichotomy, with Daniel L. Everett urging us to renounce appeals to "instinct" and "innate" knowledge on the one hand and Kiley Hamlin highlighting the dangers of assuming a blank slate when it comes to moral beliefs and behaviors, on the other.
In two independent essays broaching another aspect of cognition, Sarah-Jayne Blakemore andStephen M. Kosslyn urged readers to abandon scientifically-unfounded claims about the left brain versus the right brain, a topic I recently covered here at 13.7.
Other notable contributions about the mind by psychologists included a piece by June Gruberarguing that "negative" emotions aren't always bad and "positive" emotions always good. And one by Tom Griffiths (full disclosure: he's my husband) arguing that bias isn't always a bad thing when it comes to human or artificial intelligence. Then there was a co-authored response bypsychologist Laurie Santos and philosopher Tamar Gendler on the gulf between knowing about cognitive biases and avoiding them. Susan Fiske and Jamil Zaki wrote on human warmth and altruism.
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However, I, like the author of the piece, was especially attracted to the idea "that in fact, scientific ideas are often useful even when we know them to be false, in part because they foster a certain kind of understanding, or provide a standard against which we can understand a complex system." The author goes on to quote a response from economist Richard Thaler about the "wrong" models or economics:
"In economics there are certainly many theories, hypotheses and models that are badly flawed descriptions of the behavior of economic agents, so one might think that I would have many nominations for ideas that should be given funerals. But I don't. That is because most of these theories, while demonstrably poor descriptions of reality, are extremely useful as theoretical baselines. As such, it would be a mistake to declare these theories dead... Let's keep these and many other wrong theories and hypotheses alive, but remember they are just hypotheses, not facts. (Richard H. Thaler)"
This response fits well my own relationship with the "rational actor" economic models of human behavior. Strictly speaking all of these models are "wrong" (in the sense of not being fully correct) but they can nonetheless provide important insight into behaviors that, in turn, can help us as a society make policy and other decisions. I begin my Managerial Economics class each fall by making this point: that, indeed, many of the models I will describe will be simple, and wrong, but still provide important insights to real world behaviors and outcomes. Just because a theory or model is "wrong" doesn't mean it is not useful.
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