The basic idea was simple - states negotiate compacts (basically interstate treaties) over the distribution of river water between them, and I wanted to know if we could say anything, from an economic theory perspective, about how water was likely to be allocated in this process, and compare this to some theoretical optimum. Compacts are more common in the western states (the Colorado, for instance) but are becoming more common in the east as well. When I last revised the paper, in 2011, there were 26 of these interstate agreements:
So, I went through as much history as I could find about the negotiation processes that led to these compacts, and looked also at situations where negotiations had broken down and court cases had ensued. I used a bargaining model from Krishna and Serrano (1996), which I felt closely represented the situation faced by the states in these negotiations, and analyzed the situation under the constraints of this particular case (most importantly that water flows downstream and is prohibitively expensive to make flow the other way).
The conclusions? Not surprisingly, water is not likely to be efficiently allocated through this process (a perfectly competitive market, this is not), and, in particular, that water was likely to be over-allocated to low-value users(states) at the expense of higher value users. In the case of the Colorado River, this would suggest that more water be allowed to flow to California (the higher value users).
I have always liked this result, and feel that it does add to the conversation, but the reviewers were generally correct that my analysis lacked the rigor needed for journals which publish theoretical economic research, yet was too theoretical for journals interested in water policy! Hence, its unpublished state. In any event, as I head out west to see the Colorado River up close, this came to mind, and thought maybe this was the time to let this research see the light of day one more time.
As a tease, here are some of the graphs that came from this work:
and, if you are really interested, shoot me a note at mheintze@clarkson.edu, and I will happily share this paper in its working paper form!


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