I haven't blogged in months as my research agenda and conference (as well as family) travel took over my schedule. Now I'm preparing to start teaching again in a short two weeks! However, I want to transition back into more consistent blogging and today I saw two articles which dovetail nicely on energy poverty, electrification, climate change, and economic development.
The first, by Catherine Wolfram at the Energy Institute at UC-Berkeley, discusses some puzzles of rural electrification in the development world. She points to her own research which suggests that it would often be cheaper to connect the poor to the electricity grid than to invest in solar or other distributed energy systems. Many of the poor and unconnected are not far from the grid! This then leads to a conundrum that bringing electricity to the poor will help development but hurt the climate.
This is where the second article, by Lynne Kiesling at Knowledge Problem picks up, and really focuses on the poverty/climate nexus and what rights are held by the poor in a climate change policy regime.
I don't have much to add to this debate, except to say that these are issues that keep my up at night. I once heard Hadi Dowlatabadi, who has spent much of his distinguished career thinking about climate change, at a conference say that, in fact, poverty is the real issue, not climate change. It was moving and has kept me thinking every since.
Economics, The Environment, and Everything
and by everything I mean wine, music, beer, and, well, anything else that strikes me.
Tuesday, August 5, 2014
Tuesday, April 8, 2014
Quebec's Election
I'm no expert on Canadian politics, despite my secondary role at Clarkson as Director of the Center for Canadian Studies, but I do know that yesterday's election results in Quebec are good news for Quebec and Canada. For 30 or more years, Quebec has flirted with secession from Canada. When I was a sophomore in college at Duke, working towards my second major in Canadian Studies, I watched the results of the 1995 referendum come in with friends and colleagues in the Canadian Studies house on Campus Drive. That referendum was painfully close, and famously very geographically split with most of the land area in Quebec voting to leave, but the most populous (by a large margin) area around Montreal voting to stay.
I am convinced that Quebec's separation from Canada would be an economic disaster for Quebec, and, to a lesser extent, Canada as a whole. Quebec has, for years, been a net beneficiary of Canadian federal spending, which the province would obviously lose with secession. It would have to fund its own defense forces, and take on many other roles of the federal government, in addition to more strained relations with the rest of Canada, and possibly other trading partners as well. Capital flight, which has been a problem for Quebec for years (most of Canada's largest banks used to be based in Montreal, but now reside in Toronto) would be greatly exacerbated.
So, back to last night's election: Quebecers overwhelmingly voted for the Quebec Liberal Party over the separatist Parti Quebecois. Many interpret this result as a rejection of the idea of Quebec Independence, and the importance, to Quebec's citizens, of economic well-being over an independent Quebec. This is big news that will, in and of itself, help to secure stronger economic growth for Quebec - firms will no longer have to be concerned about future separation or the associated fallout. There is no doubt that this will result in a stronger Quebec, and a stronger Canada. Vive le Canada!
For more on this, see this quick article from the WSJ Canada desk about the results.
I am convinced that Quebec's separation from Canada would be an economic disaster for Quebec, and, to a lesser extent, Canada as a whole. Quebec has, for years, been a net beneficiary of Canadian federal spending, which the province would obviously lose with secession. It would have to fund its own defense forces, and take on many other roles of the federal government, in addition to more strained relations with the rest of Canada, and possibly other trading partners as well. Capital flight, which has been a problem for Quebec for years (most of Canada's largest banks used to be based in Montreal, but now reside in Toronto) would be greatly exacerbated.
Source: Ontario Ministry of Finance
So, back to last night's election: Quebecers overwhelmingly voted for the Quebec Liberal Party over the separatist Parti Quebecois. Many interpret this result as a rejection of the idea of Quebec Independence, and the importance, to Quebec's citizens, of economic well-being over an independent Quebec. This is big news that will, in and of itself, help to secure stronger economic growth for Quebec - firms will no longer have to be concerned about future separation or the associated fallout. There is no doubt that this will result in a stronger Quebec, and a stronger Canada. Vive le Canada!
For more on this, see this quick article from the WSJ Canada desk about the results.
Monday, April 7, 2014
I'm heading out west...
...and that has me thinking about an "old" piece of scholarship that I spent a lot of time on in the 2002-2004 period. My family and I are heading to the Desert Southwest (Zion N.P., Bryce Canyon N.P., and Grand Canyon N.P., all via Las Vegas). The research, originally intended as my "job market paper" in 2005, was a theoretical analysis of interstate water negotiations. It was motivated theoretically by this paper by Stefan Ambec and Yves Sprumont and by the book Cadillac Desert, which I have mentioned before, about the history of water in the west. Following a series of deservedly tough peer reviews, I have let this paper collect dust and chosen to let it sit as an eternal working paper rather than put more time into getting it in condition to be published.
The basic idea was simple - states negotiate compacts (basically interstate treaties) over the distribution of river water between them, and I wanted to know if we could say anything, from an economic theory perspective, about how water was likely to be allocated in this process, and compare this to some theoretical optimum. Compacts are more common in the western states (the Colorado, for instance) but are becoming more common in the east as well. When I last revised the paper, in 2011, there were 26 of these interstate agreements:
So, I went through as much history as I could find about the negotiation processes that led to these compacts, and looked also at situations where negotiations had broken down and court cases had ensued. I used a bargaining model from Krishna and Serrano (1996), which I felt closely represented the situation faced by the states in these negotiations, and analyzed the situation under the constraints of this particular case (most importantly that water flows downstream and is prohibitively expensive to make flow the other way).
The conclusions? Not surprisingly, water is not likely to be efficiently allocated through this process (a perfectly competitive market, this is not), and, in particular, that water was likely to be over-allocated to low-value users(states) at the expense of higher value users. In the case of the Colorado River, this would suggest that more water be allowed to flow to California (the higher value users).
I have always liked this result, and feel that it does add to the conversation, but the reviewers were generally correct that my analysis lacked the rigor needed for journals which publish theoretical economic research, yet was too theoretical for journals interested in water policy! Hence, its unpublished state. In any event, as I head out west to see the Colorado River up close, this came to mind, and thought maybe this was the time to let this research see the light of day one more time.
As a tease, here are some of the graphs that came from this work:
The basic idea was simple - states negotiate compacts (basically interstate treaties) over the distribution of river water between them, and I wanted to know if we could say anything, from an economic theory perspective, about how water was likely to be allocated in this process, and compare this to some theoretical optimum. Compacts are more common in the western states (the Colorado, for instance) but are becoming more common in the east as well. When I last revised the paper, in 2011, there were 26 of these interstate agreements:
So, I went through as much history as I could find about the negotiation processes that led to these compacts, and looked also at situations where negotiations had broken down and court cases had ensued. I used a bargaining model from Krishna and Serrano (1996), which I felt closely represented the situation faced by the states in these negotiations, and analyzed the situation under the constraints of this particular case (most importantly that water flows downstream and is prohibitively expensive to make flow the other way).
The conclusions? Not surprisingly, water is not likely to be efficiently allocated through this process (a perfectly competitive market, this is not), and, in particular, that water was likely to be over-allocated to low-value users(states) at the expense of higher value users. In the case of the Colorado River, this would suggest that more water be allowed to flow to California (the higher value users).
I have always liked this result, and feel that it does add to the conversation, but the reviewers were generally correct that my analysis lacked the rigor needed for journals which publish theoretical economic research, yet was too theoretical for journals interested in water policy! Hence, its unpublished state. In any event, as I head out west to see the Colorado River up close, this came to mind, and thought maybe this was the time to let this research see the light of day one more time.
As a tease, here are some of the graphs that came from this work:
and, if you are really interested, shoot me a note at mheintze@clarkson.edu, and I will happily share this paper in its working paper form!
Friday, April 4, 2014
On the benefits of Connectivity and Trade
For the vast majority of economists, it is a given that trade between [individuals, communities, countries] is good for the well-being of nearly all of the people involved. There are a number of mechanisms that make this true. The most often cited is comparative advantage - the result that even if one trading partner is absolutely better at providing every tradeable good, there will still be gains from trade because every partner will have a comparative advantage in at least one good. That is, if I am "very good" at producing the good of empirical economics research and only "good" at producing the good of theoretical economics research, and I can cooperate with a colleague who is better than me at both of these things, but only a little bit better at empirical research, than we can both benefit by specializing such that I do the empirical work and she does the theory. In this way, we can increase the total output of our research, which I presume here to be a good thing!
This result drives most of the discussion amongst economists pushing for opening up trade between countries through free trade agreements and other policies which reduce tariffs, subsidies, and other barriers to the free exchange of goods. However, there are other reasons why increased trade, and, by extension, connectivity and communication, between societies is good, both for economic growth and overall well-being. For instance, returns to scale, and agglomeration benefits (benefits that come from have lots of people with similar interests and skills together in one place) can accrue if both people and goods are mobile across borders One other big advantage that was brought to my attention today is the exchange of ideas and technologies. From the WSJ via Confessions of a Supply-side Liberal comes this article on fishing technologies in pacific island societies at the time of European contact. The gist is that societies with larger "effective" populations had more advanced fishing technology than others. The key word here is "effective" since it doesn't mean just that larger societies did better, but instead that societies with access to larger population/societal networks had this better technology. Instead of just trading goods between island groups, these groups were exchanging ideas and technology which made them all better off.
This result holds today. For one illustration of this, look at this NASA image of North Korea at night. Here is an economically isolated country without access to so many of the technologies available to much of the rest of the world, and its people suffer for it. An open world is a much more pleasant one than one where we all live in our own little cloisters isolated from the ideas and skills of each other.
Source: http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=83182 (February 24, 2014)
This result drives most of the discussion amongst economists pushing for opening up trade between countries through free trade agreements and other policies which reduce tariffs, subsidies, and other barriers to the free exchange of goods. However, there are other reasons why increased trade, and, by extension, connectivity and communication, between societies is good, both for economic growth and overall well-being. For instance, returns to scale, and agglomeration benefits (benefits that come from have lots of people with similar interests and skills together in one place) can accrue if both people and goods are mobile across borders One other big advantage that was brought to my attention today is the exchange of ideas and technologies. From the WSJ via Confessions of a Supply-side Liberal comes this article on fishing technologies in pacific island societies at the time of European contact. The gist is that societies with larger "effective" populations had more advanced fishing technology than others. The key word here is "effective" since it doesn't mean just that larger societies did better, but instead that societies with access to larger population/societal networks had this better technology. Instead of just trading goods between island groups, these groups were exchanging ideas and technology which made them all better off.
This result holds today. For one illustration of this, look at this NASA image of North Korea at night. Here is an economically isolated country without access to so many of the technologies available to much of the rest of the world, and its people suffer for it. An open world is a much more pleasant one than one where we all live in our own little cloisters isolated from the ideas and skills of each other.
Source: http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=83182 (February 24, 2014)
Addendum: Jobs Gone Awry!
Matthew Kahn at UCLA picks up a NYTimes story about a drunken court stenographer and how this has thrown a number of court cases into uncertainty and wonders why we still have human court recorders in this digital age:
"Do unions successfully thwart innovation and the introduction of technology that might reduce the demand for their services? What is the aggregate impact of such self interested efforts for overall U.S productivity and long term growth?
What tasks can people do better than machines? What work is there left for us to do? Do computers write better blog posts?"
"Do unions successfully thwart innovation and the introduction of technology that might reduce the demand for their services? What is the aggregate impact of such self interested efforts for overall U.S productivity and long term growth?
What tasks can people do better than machines? What work is there left for us to do? Do computers write better blog posts?"
How often do we let job considerations get in the way of what is an obvious improvement?
Tuesday, March 25, 2014
The Quest for Jobs Gone Awry, Part II
Nearly a month ago I wrote my most popular post to date about the problems with public policy that focuses so intently on jobs even when jobs are not the proximate motivating factor for the policy under discussion. At that point I promised a second post on the topic of jobs, focusing on jobs in the electricity sector, green, brown, or otherwise, and here I am to deliver on my promise.
The motivating articles for this post are here and here. Both articles are about energy projects with positive environmental impacts and parochial arguments against them based, in part, on arbitrary state boundaries. The first is about a HUGE (3000 MW) wind power development in Wyoming that would sell its electricity, not in Wyoming, but in California. This project, if successful, would be a major step towards greening electricity consumption in California and seemingly overcomes one of the biggest hurdles to green power development - geography. This map from NREL and AWS Truepower makes one thing clear - the areas of this country most ripe for wind development are isolated from the areas of this country with most of the people! So, this project brings the windpower from its source to where the people are (California).
Surprise, surprise, what do (some) Californians think of this? That it is terrible because all of those green jobs (wind power doesn't create that many anyway, but that is the subject for yet another blog post) will be in Wyoming and not California!
The second article is about the Champlain Hudson Power Express which is a proposed transmission superhighway running from Quebec to New York City. This will allow New York to buy cheap and relatively clean hydro power from Northern Quebec. Not surprisingly, New York power generators and unions are opposed because of the impact on jobs in NYS. In particular, the negative effect this will have on coal, oil, and nuclear power plants in the state.
But neither of these projects is about jobs! Both are, instead, about the production and marketability of green power, so let's judge them on those grounds rather than on the basis of the number of jobs created or destroyed. The Wyoming wind project can have only positive environmental effects (although whether or not subsidies to support such projects pay off is a trickier question), at least as far as climate change and air pollution are concerned.
The environmental effects from the CHPE are a little trickier to think about, but it is my belief that they are substantial. First and foremost, if the unions are correct and this will allow some shifting away from coal and other fossil fuels, that has obvious air pollution benefits especially for the residents of New York and New England, in addition to climate change benefits. Secondly, there is substantial potential for wind and other renewable development in Northern New York which is presently constrained by a lack of transmission capacity. Assuming that these potential projects will be able to hook into the CHPE, that will further the transition for New York away from fossil fuels, and those projects, as much as I don't care about this, will be "in state."
The last, non-environmental benefit from both of these projects, presumably, is lower electricity costs for consumers. If, as both proponents and opponents assume, these projects will be able to compete in electricity markets, they must be providing power cheaper than their competitors. In the case of the Wyoming wind project, this must be a cheaper way to meet California's Renewable Portfolio Standard (which mandates the proportion of electricity consumed in the state that must come from renewable sources). These economic benefits augment the environmental benefits and make my informal benefit cost analysis quite clear. Regardless of the in-state job implications, these projects are good for the states for which they are designed. Let's try to look beyond jobs and towards the greater good.
The motivating articles for this post are here and here. Both articles are about energy projects with positive environmental impacts and parochial arguments against them based, in part, on arbitrary state boundaries. The first is about a HUGE (3000 MW) wind power development in Wyoming that would sell its electricity, not in Wyoming, but in California. This project, if successful, would be a major step towards greening electricity consumption in California and seemingly overcomes one of the biggest hurdles to green power development - geography. This map from NREL and AWS Truepower makes one thing clear - the areas of this country most ripe for wind development are isolated from the areas of this country with most of the people! So, this project brings the windpower from its source to where the people are (California).
Surprise, surprise, what do (some) Californians think of this? That it is terrible because all of those green jobs (wind power doesn't create that many anyway, but that is the subject for yet another blog post) will be in Wyoming and not California!
The second article is about the Champlain Hudson Power Express which is a proposed transmission superhighway running from Quebec to New York City. This will allow New York to buy cheap and relatively clean hydro power from Northern Quebec. Not surprisingly, New York power generators and unions are opposed because of the impact on jobs in NYS. In particular, the negative effect this will have on coal, oil, and nuclear power plants in the state.
But neither of these projects is about jobs! Both are, instead, about the production and marketability of green power, so let's judge them on those grounds rather than on the basis of the number of jobs created or destroyed. The Wyoming wind project can have only positive environmental effects (although whether or not subsidies to support such projects pay off is a trickier question), at least as far as climate change and air pollution are concerned.
The environmental effects from the CHPE are a little trickier to think about, but it is my belief that they are substantial. First and foremost, if the unions are correct and this will allow some shifting away from coal and other fossil fuels, that has obvious air pollution benefits especially for the residents of New York and New England, in addition to climate change benefits. Secondly, there is substantial potential for wind and other renewable development in Northern New York which is presently constrained by a lack of transmission capacity. Assuming that these potential projects will be able to hook into the CHPE, that will further the transition for New York away from fossil fuels, and those projects, as much as I don't care about this, will be "in state."
The last, non-environmental benefit from both of these projects, presumably, is lower electricity costs for consumers. If, as both proponents and opponents assume, these projects will be able to compete in electricity markets, they must be providing power cheaper than their competitors. In the case of the Wyoming wind project, this must be a cheaper way to meet California's Renewable Portfolio Standard (which mandates the proportion of electricity consumed in the state that must come from renewable sources). These economic benefits augment the environmental benefits and make my informal benefit cost analysis quite clear. Regardless of the in-state job implications, these projects are good for the states for which they are designed. Let's try to look beyond jobs and towards the greater good.
The Challenge of Immunizations
There is little that makes me more angry than the continue spread of misinformation around the role of vaccinations/immunizations in pediatric health. I once read a quote from an anti-vaccine parent who said something to the effect of "I'm not going to let my child be a guinea pig." I thought to myself, "well, that's fine as long as you know that some other person's kid might die of a totally preventable disease because of your ignorance." I know that is a strong statement, but vaccinations have done so much good, for such a low cost over the last several decades that is disheartening to see some of that undone by misinformation.
On this topic, a friend alerted me to this article in the LATimes. The question discussed there is whether children have a legal right to be vaccinated against preventable diseases, and it is an interesting question. The broader issue of childhood vaccination, however, has to do with the externalities, in this case, positive externalities.
Externalities is economist-speak for any cost or benefit to the production or consumption of a good that does not accrue to the parties (buyers/sellers) involved in the transaction. We most often think of externalities as being negative (pollution or noise from industrial production, for instance), and the implication is that the goods associate with these externalities are over-produced and priced too low. For instance, the consumption of gasoline in automobiles has substantial environmental and other external costs which are not paid by those consuming the gasoline. In this case, the public policy solution is to raise the price of gasoline through a consumption tax so that consumers are made to pay the full cost of their consumption.
Getting back to the issue of vaccination, we can think of vaccination as a good with positive externalities. There are, of course, private benefits to vaccination which accrue to the individuals being vaccinated - that child is less likely to contract the disease for which she is vaccinated. There are also public benefits (the externalities) which accrue to society as the more of us that are vaccinated, the less likely everyone (vaccinated or not) is to contract the disease in question. Unfortunately, when deciding whether or not to vaccinate a child, the parents will surely consider the private benefits, but are less likely to consider or fully account for the public benefits. Let's suppose that parents consider ONLY the private benefits and balance these against the real or perceived private costs of vaccination. The fiduciary costs of vaccination are quite small, but over the last decade or so there has been a strong perception that there are other costs of vaccination including increased risk of the child developing autism or being otherwise adversely affected, despite the fact that these perceptions have been proven to be erroneous by the scientific literature.
We can model this scenario as in the picture above. The blue line represents the private benefits of vaccination which are declining in the number of other people who are vaccinated (since one's probability of contracting the disease, even without being vaccinated, are declining in the number of other people who are vaccinated). The green line represents the private costs of vaccination, be they monetary costs, psychic costs (a fear or needles), or perceived risks. The red line represents the net costs to society of a vaccination which are lower than the private costs because of the benefits which accrue to society. If individuals weigh their private costs against their private benefits, we would expect V people to get vaccinated. But, if we had a benign social planner, she would want V* people to be vaccinated since that is the point at which the social costs of the last vaccination exactly balance the benefits, and this is the heart of the problem: too few people will be vaccinated. In a world where private costs are very low (or the private benefits are very high, even at high societal levels of vaccination) this is not a problem since nearly everyone will choose to be vaccinated. This is the damage that has been done by the anti-vaccination movement - by increasing the perceived private costs, they have widened the gap between perceived private costs and real social costs causing there to be too few children vaccinated, which, in turn, as resulted in outbreaks of diseases many once thought were virtually eradicated in the developed world.
So, we come to the issue of public policy interventions to solve this problem and narrow this vaccination gap. There are a couple of options:
1) Use information campaigns to dispel mis-information and reduce the perceived costs of vaccination - In an ideal world, this solves the problem, but as climate scientists will tell you, information provision only goes so far. The other side of this is to make clear just what the damages of not vaccinating your child could be - make clear the danger in which such parents are putting not only their own child, but those around them.
2) Subsidize vaccination - This would serve to reduce private costs and should encourage more people to vaccinate. But, if perceived costs are very high (fears of autism) this is unlikely to be effective
3) Mandate vaccination - The traditional approach, vaccinations have been mandated for children attending public schools for decades. Basically, this increases the costs of NOT vaccinating one's children since parents would have to home-school or find other educational options for their children to avoid this mandate. Unfortunately, has stopped working as well as it did historically in light of the high perceived risks and we are forced, for now, to deal with
4) Make parents legally liable for vaccination based on the legal right of the child to be vaccinated as suggested in the original LATimes article. To me this would define non-vaccinating parents as "negligent." This is, again, raising the costs of non-vaccination which following Becker's Theory of Crime, should work to mitigate the problem.
Whatever policies we use here (I vote for the kitchen sink approach myself), this map from the Council on Foreign Relations illustrates the problem we are dealing with.
On this topic, a friend alerted me to this article in the LATimes. The question discussed there is whether children have a legal right to be vaccinated against preventable diseases, and it is an interesting question. The broader issue of childhood vaccination, however, has to do with the externalities, in this case, positive externalities.
Externalities is economist-speak for any cost or benefit to the production or consumption of a good that does not accrue to the parties (buyers/sellers) involved in the transaction. We most often think of externalities as being negative (pollution or noise from industrial production, for instance), and the implication is that the goods associate with these externalities are over-produced and priced too low. For instance, the consumption of gasoline in automobiles has substantial environmental and other external costs which are not paid by those consuming the gasoline. In this case, the public policy solution is to raise the price of gasoline through a consumption tax so that consumers are made to pay the full cost of their consumption.
Getting back to the issue of vaccination, we can think of vaccination as a good with positive externalities. There are, of course, private benefits to vaccination which accrue to the individuals being vaccinated - that child is less likely to contract the disease for which she is vaccinated. There are also public benefits (the externalities) which accrue to society as the more of us that are vaccinated, the less likely everyone (vaccinated or not) is to contract the disease in question. Unfortunately, when deciding whether or not to vaccinate a child, the parents will surely consider the private benefits, but are less likely to consider or fully account for the public benefits. Let's suppose that parents consider ONLY the private benefits and balance these against the real or perceived private costs of vaccination. The fiduciary costs of vaccination are quite small, but over the last decade or so there has been a strong perception that there are other costs of vaccination including increased risk of the child developing autism or being otherwise adversely affected, despite the fact that these perceptions have been proven to be erroneous by the scientific literature.
We can model this scenario as in the picture above. The blue line represents the private benefits of vaccination which are declining in the number of other people who are vaccinated (since one's probability of contracting the disease, even without being vaccinated, are declining in the number of other people who are vaccinated). The green line represents the private costs of vaccination, be they monetary costs, psychic costs (a fear or needles), or perceived risks. The red line represents the net costs to society of a vaccination which are lower than the private costs because of the benefits which accrue to society. If individuals weigh their private costs against their private benefits, we would expect V people to get vaccinated. But, if we had a benign social planner, she would want V* people to be vaccinated since that is the point at which the social costs of the last vaccination exactly balance the benefits, and this is the heart of the problem: too few people will be vaccinated. In a world where private costs are very low (or the private benefits are very high, even at high societal levels of vaccination) this is not a problem since nearly everyone will choose to be vaccinated. This is the damage that has been done by the anti-vaccination movement - by increasing the perceived private costs, they have widened the gap between perceived private costs and real social costs causing there to be too few children vaccinated, which, in turn, as resulted in outbreaks of diseases many once thought were virtually eradicated in the developed world.
So, we come to the issue of public policy interventions to solve this problem and narrow this vaccination gap. There are a couple of options:
1) Use information campaigns to dispel mis-information and reduce the perceived costs of vaccination - In an ideal world, this solves the problem, but as climate scientists will tell you, information provision only goes so far. The other side of this is to make clear just what the damages of not vaccinating your child could be - make clear the danger in which such parents are putting not only their own child, but those around them.
2) Subsidize vaccination - This would serve to reduce private costs and should encourage more people to vaccinate. But, if perceived costs are very high (fears of autism) this is unlikely to be effective
3) Mandate vaccination - The traditional approach, vaccinations have been mandated for children attending public schools for decades. Basically, this increases the costs of NOT vaccinating one's children since parents would have to home-school or find other educational options for their children to avoid this mandate. Unfortunately, has stopped working as well as it did historically in light of the high perceived risks and we are forced, for now, to deal with
4) Make parents legally liable for vaccination based on the legal right of the child to be vaccinated as suggested in the original LATimes article. To me this would define non-vaccinating parents as "negligent." This is, again, raising the costs of non-vaccination which following Becker's Theory of Crime, should work to mitigate the problem.
Whatever policies we use here (I vote for the kitchen sink approach myself), this map from the Council on Foreign Relations illustrates the problem we are dealing with.
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